A decade of mismanagement: how Milan, Inter, and Juventus were overtaken by the English Premier League
The two Milanese clubs missed a huge opportunity after their Champions League wins. Stadium, transfer policy, primitive marketing policy: in a few years, Calcio ceded its economic superiority to England, Spain and Germany
During its heyday in the 90’s, and arguably in the early noughties, Italy’s Serie A was the premier destination for the marquee names in world football. The Italian championship was rightfully considered the best league in the world. Silvio Berlusconi-backed Milan won multiple Champions League trophies, and is the last club to have defended the title before it changed its format. Fellow Serie A giants Juventus also regularly competed for the top prize in club football, winning it once and making several appearances in the finals.
But even before the Calciopoli match-fixing scandal effectively hit the reset button on the Italian league Serie A’s leading clubs were stagnating, if not regressing altogether. The fact that Serie A’s
broadcasting deals are second only to the mega-rich contracts of the English Premier League is misleading. Out of the 4 Serie A clubs inside the Top 20 of Deloitte’s Football Money League (2012-13)
Juventus at no. 9 is the highest ranked Italian representative with a turnover of €272,4 million.
However, 10 years ago Juventus
were ranked no. 2, just behind EPL behemoth Manchester United. The Bianconeri’s revenue of €218,8 million was off 13% of the Red Devils €251,2 million turnover - a respectable but not insurmountable difference, especially when considering the lure of Serie A at the time. Nowadays Serie A’s leading club (revenue-wise) is
50% off of Manchester United’s €423,8 million turnover, who sit at no. 4, let alone pace setter Real Madrid whose €518,9 million revenue is 90% bigger than the Bianconeri’s.
Of course Juventus' development has been hampered by their brief stint in Italy’s second tier, Serie B, following their alleged involvement in the
Calciopoli scandal. Still, whereas Manchester United’s revenue grew 69% since 2003, Juventus increase of 24% is somewhat underwhelming, even when their one year absence from top level football is taken into account. It’s just in the past two years that the
Bianconeri were able to reach their pre-Calciopoli levels. Though Manchester United’s rise has undoubtedly been augmented by the
increased marketability of the EPL, only 28% of the Red Devils turnover is generated from broadcasting. Meanwhile Juventus rely heavily on broadcasting as it accounts for a massive 61% of their revenue, which is set to decrease in the wake of their premature exit at the group stages of this year’s Champions League tournament.
If only the Old Lady was guilty of this rather lopsided approach Serie A sides would not regularly find themselves in the unfavorable position of having to sell its best assets year in and year out. After all, even though football is considered a team sport it’s the individual stars draw the most attention, which in turn attract sponsors.
At its peak Serie A was home to the biggest names in the sport. In 1997 the Brazilian
Ronaldo signed for Internazionale Milan after a stellar season at Barcelona, Zinedine
Zidane wore the jersey of the
Bianconeri before sealing a world-record transfer to Real Madrid in 2001, while the stalwarts of the Italian game such as Paolo
Maldini or Alessandro
Nesta never left their native.
The aforementioned transfer of Zinedine Zidane in 2001 is in many ways
a landmark moment. There’s the world-record fee of €73,5 million (€89 million in today’s currency) which signaled the era of mega-money transfers, and the implications that accompanied Zidane’s move – Serie A can’t retain its biggest stars at their peak.
Following Zidane’s transfer Italian clubs participated in
a spending frenzy that lasted several years, buying and selling players for obscene amounts of money even by current standards, with little to no regard to long-term viability. Rui Costa,
Gaizka Mendieta,
Gianluigi Buffon and
Hernan Crespo all shattered the €40 million-mark, in the latter 90’s and early noughties no less - meaning once adjusted for inflation those evaluations increase even further. To provide some context for the sheer absurdity of these transfers, in 2000-01 Manchester United’s €217,2 million turnover was good enough for the number 1 position in the Deloitte Football Money League.
Since 2001 La Liga clubs have won the Champions League 4 times, whereas
Serie A sides have secured the elusive trophy on 3 occasions, while the EPL teams have also won 3 Champions League cups. But even though the 3 Champions League triumphs definitely attest to the quality of the Italian league the exploration of its commercial interests has been woefully neglected.
Among the Champions League winners since 2001,
Milan’s revenue of €263,5 million is only good for the 6th position; just ahead of
Liverpool’s €240,6 million turnover. More interesting though is the fact that the Reds haven’t been competing in Champions League for 4 years now, making Milan’s turnover even more depressing.
Worse still, in the period from 2001-2005 AC Milan have had the greatest revenue of all Champions League winners. In wake of Calciopoli (2006) Milan alongside Internazionale have generated the least (and almost identical) turnover among the title-holders. The palry increase in revenue (or lack thereof) among the two Milan clubs makes for a discouraging read.
Milan in particular disappoints. The
Rossoneri’s increase from €200,4 million in 2003 to €227,2 million in 2007 is only a 13,4% improvement over 4 years. Considering that the Champions League is the biggest prize in club football not capitalizing of their triumphs must be considered a missed opportunity.
According to general consensus (or popular opinion) the cycle of a dominant team usually lasts somewhere between 3 to 5 years, which just about falls in line with the 2 Champions League triumphs that Milan achieved in the mid-noughties (2003, 2007).
In the post-Calciopoli reality both Milan clubs
revenue decreased following their Champions League success. AC Milan’s turnover sank 8% while Internazionale's revenue was cut by 6%.
Strikingly, when comparing Milan with Internazionale, the
Rossoneri organization that won the 2003-04 Champions League steadily declined over the next 5 years. But even though
il Diavolo fared better (financially) in their second cycle (2007-11), as they experienced a brief upswing, they almost made any gains negligible in the 5th year.
A better benchmark would be to
compare the developments of Milan and Barcelona as they both enjoyed similar success (at least in the Champions League) in the last 10 years, and work within comparable frameworks (individual broadcasting deals). Of course the
Blaugrana accumulated more domestic titles than their Italian counterparts, but then again, Barcelona started off from a worse position than the
Rossoneri. For the 2003-04 season
Milan were ranked no. 3 in the Deloitte Football Money League with revenues of €221,1 million, while Barcelona’s €169,9 million turnover qualified them for rank no. 7, or in other words, the
Rossoneri’s income was 23% higher than the
Blaugrana’s.
Strangely enough for the first 3 years after winning the Champions League Milan and Barcelona’s development is almost identical, but while the
Rossoneri continued to decline the
Blaugrana took full advantage of their treble season and steadied their growth at a higher rather than their Italian counterparts.
But Milan isn't the only Milanese club that is guilty of blowing opportunities to elevate to the next level. Instead of fully capitalizing on
an historic treble in a manner the
Blaugrana did, Internazionale were found wanting in their ambitions of establishing themselves among Europe’s financial elite.
Partly in an effort to comply with UEFA’s Financial Fair Play initiative, but also fueled by their dwindling turnover the
Nerazzurri’s
revenue from transfer sales eclipsed their expenditures for acquisitions in the 3 years after the 2009-10 treble campaign.
Though not quite the selling club Internazionale nowadays only reinvest revenues from preceding sales (€167,5 million) to fund new recruits (€145,4 million). A stark contrast to the previous policy under
Massimo Moratti, who appears to have
lost interest in the
Nerazzurri after his club won the Champions League, the one trophy he craved the most.
Spending isn’t a guarantee to win trophies but the acquisition of world-class talent goes some way in improving the chances of succeeding. Unlike the
Nerazzurri the
Blaugrana adopted a more aggressive stance and more spent more than double (€245,5 million) the value of the revenue from player sales (€113,3 million) on new recruits.
Ever since their heroics in Madrid, the
Nerazzurri have quickly fallen off the map, domestic and abroad. In recent seasons Internazionale have even
struggled to secure a Champions League berth that would provide a much needed injection of fresh capital. Sure, Barcelona was in a better economic shape than Internazionale to begin with but the Blaugrana had to manage without the generosity of a billionaire benefactor for all of its existence. It’s a strange phenomenon indeed.
Apart from both Manchester teams and
Paris Saint-Germain most billionaire-backed clubs don’t experience a rapid, or rather accelerated growth earnings-wise. Of course, the revenue does increase over time but not at a rate that would justify the previous outlays.
English Premier League team
Chelsea turnover has grown 39% from €217,5 million in 2003-04 to €303,4 million in 2012-13. In the same period Milan’s revenue
increased 19% from €222,1 million to €263,5 million, while Internazionale’s income all but stagnated (outside of a 3 year stretch that followed the 2009-10 treble campaign) at €168,8 million (€167,1 million; +1%).
It’s pretty much reaffirms the notion that the
billionaires owners primary interest lies with the success
on the pitch rather than off it. However, since then the English Premier League has continued to gain in popularity, and more importantly in marketability over the last 10 years, lessening the pressure on owners such as Mr. Abramovich to supplement the budgets of their clubs with their own personal fortune.
Under the new terms of the most recent broadcast deal even the lowest ranked Premier League club is guaranteed around £63 million (€75 million) in TV-Money.
Despite Serie A having the
second most expensive broadcast rights and as a consequence of individually negotiated contracts the revenue stream of Italy’s top clubs is extremely lopsided. Milan and Juventus' earnings from broadcasting (€140,9 million; €166 million) are only dwarfed by the income generated by La Liga giants Real Madrid and FC Barcelona (€188,3 million; €188,2 million), who also benefit from individual agreements. But unlike the La Liga duo, the
Rossoneri and the
Bianconeri – and the majority of Italian clubs – don’t earn nearly as much from other avenues.
Since 2003-04 Italian clubs have missed a trick or two in terms of how to
diversify their source(s) of income. Most Italian clubs don’t own their
stadiums and have incredibly thin (or less lucrative) sponsorship portfolios. While the former is dependent on various factors (location, funding, permissions) the latter is more or less the result of gross neglect. Calciopoli shouldn’t be allowed as an excuse for stagnating commercial income across the league.
True enough, there are indeed a few components that make Serie A in general a less appealing proposition to sponsors than the English Premier League, or even the Bundesliga.
Racism at the stadiums is still a bothersome issue that hasn’t been resolved (but isn’t exclusive to Serie A, not by any stretch),
low attendance also makes for terrible television, but at the forefront is the lack of genuine star power, household names that boost the marketability of the league. A common criticism leveled at Serie A clubs, particularly the big three (AC Milan, Internazionale and Juventus), is that
they prefer seasoned players to youngsters to the point that they cultivate veteran squads. Italy went from a hot spot for new and exciting talent to a retirement league of sorts. Though it is true that the majority of Serie A clubs can’t match the wages offered abroad, even the ones that can, more often than not opt to renew a rich contract with a veteran than to promote a youngster.
It’s a gamble most Serie A teams, at least the ones competing in the Champions League,
aren’t willing to take. Because missing out on Europe’s top tier club competition would lead to reduced revenues from broadcasting, the main source of income for Serie A’s top teams. It’s a simple enough reasoning but also one that leads to more problems down the road.
The Milan squads that clinched won 2 Champions League titles between the periods from 2003 to 2005, and between 2007 to 2009, were on average
29,5 years*, and 29,4 years old*. Internazionale’s squad(s) between 2010 to 2012 averaged 28,2 years*. On the surface these squads are still on the right side of 30. But the
Rossoneri for instance had relative small squads throughout these two periods, averaging 23 and 26 players during those cycles, suggesting a high percentage of players above the age of 30.
At present the
Diavolo find itself in
a rebuilding phase, or at least they should. After the conclusion of the 2011-12 campaign no less than 5 key players (Alessandro Nesta, 36; Gianluca Zambrotta, 35; Mark van Bommel, 34; Gennaro Gattuso, 34; Clarence Seedorf, 35) retired or left the club. Whether van Bommel or Zambrotta were key players is debatable, but the fact that both joined in the twilight of their careers (33; 31) is undisputed. It’s a testimony to the shortsightedness of Milan’s management.
Internazionale are also guilty of
extending the lifespan of untenable contracts beyond their usefulness. The
Nerazzurri’s squads between 2010 and 2012 averaged 30 players and 28,2 years*. Unsurprisingly, Milan’s other team has also been forced to adopt a new transfer policy (which is already being questioned after the acquisition of
Nemanja Vidic on a 3 year contract).
There’s a reason why a significant amount of clubs have imposed
a rigid over 30 policy. Premier League club Arsenal only offers one-year extensions to players over the age of 30. The most common procedure is to sell players aged 28, 29 with two or less years remaining on their contracts. It’s a sound strategy that makes sense both economically and from a sporting point of view.
But as is the case with both Milan teams when the average squad age is leaning towards 30 wholesale changes - per definition - come abruptly, not gradually. Coupled with a lopsided revenue stream that revolves around income from broadcasting, and the likelihood of rejuvenating an ageing squad diminishes. Worse still, bloated wage bills are the primary reason why these clubs have to qualify for the Champions League in the first place.
In a way professional football players or athletes in general, are a bit like shares. An outstanding performance drives the market value, or share price. The equivalent to exceptional gains in the industry (exceeding forecasts, sales targets) would be a title winning campaign. The value of the squad, and more importantly individual players, surges.
But Milan and Inter were maintaining squads whose
average age was closing in on 30. By the time highly influential and important players such as Clarence
Seedorf, 31; or Gennaro
Gattuso, 30; lifted the Champions League trophy in 2007, they had little to no resale value, despite being part of a title-winning outfit.
Internazionale had
Lucio, 32;
Maicon, 29; Marco
Materazzi, 37; Esteban Cambiasso, 30; and Diego Milito, 31; on their books for the 2010-11 season. They were all integral to the
Nerazzurri’s 2009-10 campaign, but with the exception of Maicon had absolutely no resale value. The Brazilian did leave the Milan outfit in 2012, at the age of 31, when his market value deteriorated to a paltry €3,8 million, to join Premier League club Manchester City.
The handling of Maicon’s transfer is somewhat symbolic for what is wrong with Italian football. Real Madrid allegedly bid close to €30 million in the summer of 2010 to secure his services – an offer not deemed not sufficient enough by the Inter hierarchy. Massimo Moratti and the
Nerazzurri overplayed their hand by not sanctioning Maicon’s sale, especially since Inter didn’t have many salable assets to begin with.
Salable, or in this case profitable, refers to the sale of a player edging towards 30 that commands a high market value. Not youngsters who haven’t entered their peak yet.
Nevertheless, the
"Beneamata" did generate
€167,5 million in player sales, which they accomplished by selling the likes of Mario
Balotelli (19, €29;5 million, Manchester City),
Coutinho (20, €10 million, Liverpool FC), Davide
Santon (20, €5,7 million, Newcastle United) among others - exactly the kind of players that would comprise the very foundation of a new project. It is worth mentioning though that they lucked out in Samuel Eto’o’s €27,5 million transfer to Russian club Anzhi Makhachkala.
Milan’s respectable €113,1 million revenue from player sales was largely boosted by one departure in particular,
Kaka’s €65 million transfer to Real Madrid in 2009, once again highlighting the inherent dangers of not keeping a close eye on the average squad age.
Of course,
Barcelona also generated huge earnings from player sales (€82 million from 2006-08; €113,3 million from 2009-11), but for every high profile exit (Deco, Gianluca Zambrotta, Ronaldinho, Zlatan Ibrahimovic),
they either already had a replacement ready (Lionel Messi, Andres Iniesta), or acquired a significantly younger successor (Dani Alves).
The first thing that comes to mind when looking at this graphic, Milan were the most frugal, while
Barcelona were the biggest spenders in the 3 years after winning the Champions League. But unlike the Blaugrana, or even Bayern Munich, the Milanese clubs didn’t really have a sound
transfer policy in place, not one that laid the groundwork for any long-term project anyways.
In July 2008 Milan all too happily signed Barcelona duo
Ronaldinho, 28, for €25 million, alongside
Zambrotta, 31, for €10 million. Yet again squandering €35 million (plus the high wages both have likely earned over the lifetime of their contracts) on ageing players who were already past their prime instead of investing those funds in younger players. It’s safe to say that acquiring Ronaldinho has done nothing to boost the marketability of Milan anywhere, outside a few weeks of increased media interest.
Among the (in)glorious signings the
Nerazzurri have made – Diego Forlan, 32; €5 million;
Antonio Cassano, 29, €5 million;
Rodrigo Palacio, 30, €10,5 million. Maybe the fees for Forlan and Cassano weren’t as high as some of the Rossoneri’s transfers but the wages certainly were.
It’s quite telling that Milan’s net spending from 2003-05 (€19,3 million) was significantly lower than Bayern Munich’s outlay (€58,8 million) following their 2001 Champions League triumph, at
a ratio of 3 to 1. The Bundesliga club didn’t rest on their laurels, and even though another Champions League trophy eluded them for the next 12 years the
Germans maintained a younger squad than Milan, with an average age of 27,4*.
Barcelona, under the stewardship of then president
Joan Laporta, underwent a drastic change from a failing giant to the second biggest club, in terms of revenue, in all of sports. As recent as 2004-05 Milan were ranked above Barcelona in the Deloitte Football Money League with revenues of
€234 million to the Blaugrana’s €207,9 million.
But since then the Catalans blew past the Italians which is evident in their spending that followed in the 3 year periods after Champions League triumphs in 2006 (
€113 million) and 2009 (
€133,3 million). Just like the Bavarians did before them the La Liga giants also opted to rejuvenate and/or maintain relative young squads both times around (26,9* from 2006 – 2009; 26,5* from 2009 – 2011).
Granted, maintaining a young squad doesn’t improve the chances of winning, nor does it correlate to reduced wage bills. It does, however, offer flexibility and provides some protection against depreciation – at elite level. In this case the market value of the players.
The weak revenue streams of Serie A clubs outside of broadcasting haven’t been properly addressed as evidenced by Italy’s big 3 clubs (AC Milan, Internazionale and Juventus). The Italian clubs that qualify for the Champions League, and thus a bigger share of the proceeds, stand to generate in excess of
€100-plus million in TV money. Conversely, those that don’t are missing out on a sizeable chuck of income. Beginning with the 2014-15 season the Milan clubs are effectively
€20-30 million short on capital (based on past performances by Serie A clubs), a sum which could increase further should they even fail to qualify for Europa League.
Being
absent from Europe altogether could be a blessing in disguise though, as the financial rewards of Uefa’s second tier tournament are rendered negligible against the backdrop of a congested fixture calendar. Instead of competing in 3 tournaments (Serie A, the domestic cup, plus possibly the Europa League), the Milanese clubs can focus their efforts on qualifying for the Champions League by way of mounting a strong challenge for the Scudetto.
Whereas both Milan clubs are forced into the R’s (rebuilding, rejuvenating, restructuring), Juventus are also at a pivotal point. Though the Old Lady has successfully ascended back to the top of Calcio, the Turin club is at risk of
repeating the mistakes of the two Milan teams – namely allowing their squad to grow old without having adequate replacement in place.
The average squad age of Juventus is a staggering
29,4*, which suggests that the team is or will be in need of a major overhaul. Signing Fernando
Llorente, 29, on a free transfer was a shrewd piece of business, considering that Juventus lacked a top-class striker for quite some time. Adding Carlos Tevez, 30, for €9 million, was an opportunistic but viable operation. But keeping
Mirko Vucinic, 30, and
Fabio Quagliarella, 31, on the payroll made no sense whatsoever, especially when both their contracts are set to expire in 2015.
Worryingly, Turin’s two most valuable assets: Paul
Pogba, 20; and Arturo
Vidal, 26; are being linked with big money transfers this summer. In the current market climate it’s feasible to assume the sales of Pogba and Vidal could generate upwards of €80 million. But can Juventus afford to not only sign but also pay their replacements?
Pogba is already valued at
€45 million, and quite unique one might add, a younger version of Yaya Toure or Patrick Viera. Paris Saint-Germain are rumored to be prepared to offer him wages as high as €10 million annually.
Frankly, selling Pogba for even €60 million
isn’t good business. His replacement would likely cost upwards of €20 million (if Turin decided to sign a high profile player around the age of 25), agent fees to the tune of 10-15% (€2 – 3million), plus wages of around €6 million (gross) over a 4 year contract.
When all costs are factored in replacing the Frenchman could very well amount to a total of €47 million (at the lower end of the calculation). Subtracting that total from a hypothetical €60 million transfer fee and the net gain is
a meager €13 million. Over the next couple of years Pogba’s stock is all but guaranteed to rise. The youngster should be central to Juventus aspirations, on and off the pitch. It’s one of the reasons why it made sense for Barcelona to acquire Neymar.
Lionel
Messi may enter the history books as the greatest player to ever grace the Camp Nou, but he’s
an Adidas athlete (Barcelona’s kit supplier is Nike) which prevents synergies between those two rivaling brands. Any individual marketing campaign that features Messi lacks any reference of FC Barcelona. Conversely, the
Blaugrana can’t exploit Messi’s likeness in individual adverts (due to Barcelona’s deal with Nike). Nevertheless, his star power allows the Catalans to piggyback on his popularity to draw other sponsors, as is the case with Cristiano Ronaldo (Nike) and Real Madrid (Adidas).
Juventus should renew Pogba’s (and Vidal’s) contracts, even if they have to smash their wage structure to accommodate them. Premier League club Tottenham Hotspurs sold Gareth Bale for a rumored
€100 million to Real Madrid. Regardless of reinvesting the cash from his sale into the squad the London club is no better off than they were before, in spite of signing the likes of Erik
Lamela, Roberto
Soldado and a few more.
Tottenham Hotspurs are no closer to Champions League football, much less a credible title challenge. But they are deprived of their most recognizable player and single most marketable asset. The
Bianconeri on the other hand are on track for
a third successive Scudetto and have the potential to mix it up in Europe – provided they add more depth to their squad.
Serie A suffers a distinct lack of superstars, global icons so to speak, not stars of the sport. Lionel Messi, Cristiano Ronaldo, Ronaldinho, even Neymar are superstars. The kind of athletes sponsors gravitate towards. But those are few and far in between. Nonetheless, it explains the rather light
portfolios in regards to big companies (outside of kit suppliers), of Milan (Ethiad, Fujitsu, Huawei), Internazionale (Pirelli, SAP), and Juventus (Jeep, Samsung, bwin).
Barcelona can boast Qatar Airways, Audi, Intel, Coca Cola, EA Sports, Allianz, and Panasonic among others.
Real Madrid’s portfolio includes Emirates, bwin, Audi, Samsung, Coca Cola and more.
Manchester United have agreements/partnerships with Aon, DHL, Chevrolet, bwin, Toshiba, EPSON, Thomas Cook and a few others in place, attesting to their worldwide reach. Even
Bayern Munich has an impressive line-up of sponsors: Lufthansa, Samsung, Siemens, Allianz, Audi, and other deals notwithstanding.
Basically, Italian clubs either don’t have the reach or draw to attract the kind of sponsorships Barcelona, Madrid, Manchester or even Bayern were able to land since the heyday of Serie A in the early noughties.
In conclusion, many of
Serie A’s problems are homemade. Save for the issues revolving around stadium ownership, Italy’s big 3 (who are representative for Calcio) seem to
distrust youngsters, and place an unhealthy reliance on
veterans that is either born out of loyalty for past accomplishments or long-term contracts. Ageing squads may or may not be able to mastermind one last triumph, but even in the event of success they’re not likely to attract sponsors who target a younger audience.
Moreover, Serie A clubs have tendency to sell its most valuable assets
before their peak, and sign replacements that enter the latter stages of their careers, repeating a vicious cycle. The Milanese clubs are the most prominent cases for shortsighted transfer policies that find their origins even before the Calciopoli scandal in 2006.
Despite producing 3 Champions League winners since 2001, neither the clubs that accomplished these triumphs, nor Serie A as a league, were able to profit from these successes. In 2001-02, Real Madrid and FC Barcelona were ranked
behind Juventus and Milan in the Deloitte Football Money League. These days the La Liga duo has almost doubled the annual turnover of both – in a comparable framework (individual broadcasting agreements).
The upside, however, there’s plenty of room for improvement. Central to any change of fortune are of course the exploits on the pitch. But as the
Real Madrid’s Galactico model has proven it’s not as fundamental as one might suspect, winning titles isn’t a necessity to increased revenue streams. On the other hand, Serie A clubs lack the funds to underwrite the acquisitions of superstar players in the mold of a David Beckham or Cristiano Ronaldo.
At this point it is rather counter-productive to sell the league’s biggest stars abroad if the sole motivation behind it is to generate funds for transfers. Indeed, if Juventus were to sell Pogba and Vidal the Old Lady could make massive profits
but at what cost?
There was probably no benefit to Milan – other than balancing the books for the 2009-10 season - when the
Rossoneri sold Kaka (then 27) to Real Madrid, despite receiving €65 million for the Brazilian. The biggest problem lies with Calcio’s lax over 30-policy. Handing out contracts to veterans is good enough for mid-table clubs, but shouldn’t be an option for clubs with designs on European glory, let alone the upper echelon of Deloitte’s Football Money League.
Free transfers are anything but cheap – when the player is aged 28 and older. They just delay the inevitable and should be considered stop-gap solutions to long-term problems. Therein lies the real issue – the majority of Italian clubs prefer opportunity to long-term planning.
Napoli and Fiorentina are the exception to the rule, the
Partenopei in particular. In recent seasons Napoli has reinvested the funds generated by the sales of Ezequiel
Lavezzi and Edinson Cavani into the squad, all the while keeping a hold of star player Marek
Hamšík. Yet Napoli’s €116 million turnover for the 2012-13 season indicates that the Partenopei’s grand outlay of €100,7 million in transfer expenses ahead of the 2013-14 campaign is normally beyond their means.
Fortunately, Napoli is on track to qualify for the Champions League play-off round, perhaps even direct qualification. At any rate, the
Partenopei alongside a youthful and vibrant Fiorentina side cannot offset non-qualification as the two Milanese clubs can. Either way, the fact that
Italy continues to produce exceptional talent is proof that the problems don’t originate from neglected youth development, but the opportunistic tendencies at administrative level, paired with a culture that prefers veterans to youngsters.
Perhaps old is reliable, but young is exciting. Not to mention more profitable.
Tuesday, April 15 th, 2014
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